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abstract
This paper begins by affirming the view that if there is a debate to be had 
over whether literature can convey moral knowledge, then efforts by propo-
nents to substantiate this claim will already be necessarily conditioned by 
an understanding of what morality consists in, independently of literature. 
This observation brings to light a certain danger for the debate, namely that 
if participants fail to explicitly specify the ethical theory that they rely on, 
then the debate can seem nebulous. This raises a new question: is there an 
account of morality, independent of literature, which is most conducive to 
literary moral cognitivism, that is, which optimises literary moral cogni-
tivism’s chances of succeeding philosophically? This paper both formulates 
and investigates this hypothesis with reference to moral pluralism, the view 
that there is an irreducible plurality of foundational moral principles. It 
concludes that such an affinity exists, but with an important caveat: the 
affinity is stronger at the level of moral suggestion than the level of moral 
justification. This has implications for the strength of the version of literary 
moral cognitivism that it is ultimately plausible to endorse from a moral 
pluralist point of view.
keywords: literary moral cognitivism, moral pluralism, Berys Gaut, moral 
justification 
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introduction
The epistemic component of literary moral cognitivism claims that some 
literary works are capable of conveying moral knowledge.1 One version of 
this position claims that literature has a special capacity for moral sugges-
tion, and that the moral suggestions that a work of literature can make may 
correspond not only to beliefs either that the reader already holds, or at 
least whose content the reader is already familiar with, but, importantly, to 
views and insights that the reader simply would not have come across were it 
not for reading the literary work. A stronger version of the cognitivist posi-
tion claims that literature can be a source of moral justification for the very 
suggestions it seems to be making, which is to say that there may be occa-
sions on which the reader does not need to turn to activities extrinsic to the 
encounter with a literary work in order to rationally decide that what the 
work is suggesting is in fact morally justified. A standard challenge to the 
plausibility of this stronger claim is that the advancement of a truth needs to 
be accompanied by the usual intellectual supporting apparatus comprising 
such activities as the diligent marshalling of evidence and rational argu-
mentation.2 According to this objection, since such supporting apparatus 
is almost always extrinsic to the purview of literary works, and certainly 
extrinsic to the works that literary moral cognitivists are inclined to cite in 
support of their position, the stronger version of literary moral cognitivism 
is undermined.
It may not be assumed that this objection is premised on an equiva-
lence between knowledge and justified true belief. The traditional tripartite 
account of knowledge remains a matter of epistemological dispute, most 
notably in the wake of Gettier-style counter-examples purporting to show 
that occasions can arise in which true justified beliefs do not reasonably 
count as knowledge.3 For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient for us 
merely to endorse the view that even if the traditional tripartite account 
of knowledge should turn out to require some kind of enhancement, any 
such enhancement would not have to involve a cancellation of the justifi-
cation condition. Indeed, one of the main ways of responding to Gettier-
style counter-examples (by those who take Gettier’s position to be sound) 
is to argue that the tripartite account needs to be supplemented with a 
fourth condition, not that the justification condition needs to be replaced. 
Without committing ourselves either way with respect to the traditional tri-
partite account, we can, I would suggest, engage substantively with what is 
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epistemically at stake in literary moral cognitivism by restricting the scope 
of our investigations to the related questions of moral suggestion and moral 
justification.
Perhaps, then, the form of a convincing answer to the objection that 
I mentioned to literary moral cognitivism lies not in trying to equivocate 
over the place of justification in an account of knowledge, but in arguing 
that literature turns out to be capable of supporting certain modalities of 
moral justification. This raises a new problem. Literature may be more adept 
at providing justification for beliefs about moral consequences than moral 
duties (or vice-versa); more adept at providing justification for beliefs about 
moral contracts than moral virtues (or vice-versa). The philosophical suc-
cess of literary moral cognitivism, then, may well depend on the account of 
morality that one happens to have adopted.
My working hypothesis in this article is that the debate surrounding 
literary moral cognitivism stands to benefit from a discursive requirement 
that talk of “morality” should always be tied to a particular school of moral 
theory. I don’t deny that this approach may have its disadvantages. For one 
thing, thinking at the level of a particular moral theory would seem to nec-
essarily defer final adjudication on literary moral cognitivism per se. On 
the other hand, failing to specify the particular moral theory that one has 
in mind can lend what one says a sanctimonious ring, and has a tendency 
to make the debate about literature and morality somewhat nebulous: it 
increases the risk of goal-post shifting, be it deliberate or inadvertent.4 The 
intended advantage, therefore, of my imposing this requirement is that it 
should give us a firmer grip on just what literature’s potential contributions 
to the processes of moral justification might consist in.
Is literature qua literature neutral with respect to the moral theories it 
is suited to supporting, or does it have an affinity for certain moral schools? 
There can be no short-cuts to answering this question. The labor of address-
ing it will consist in selecting different moral theories in turn, and searching 
for reasons why such an affinity might exist in each case. I have already 
alluded in passing to consequentialism, deontology, contractualism, and 
virtue ethics. It is worth appending to this list moral pluralism, the view 
that there is an irreducible plurality of foundational moral principles. Are 
there reasons for positing an epistemologically significant compatibility 
between literature and the modalities of moral justification most pertinent 
to moral pluralism? The purpose of this article is to investigate whether 
such an affinity might exist.
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prima facie grounds for hypothesising an affinity
Moral pluralists are particularists to the extent that they maintain that what 
a moral agent ought to do in a given situation depends on the intricacies of 
the particular case.5 But this doesn’t explain why moral pluralism qualifies 
as a moral theory in its own right. The reply which I take to be implicit in 
the moral theory of W. D. Ross captures much of what is attractive about the 
moral pluralist position, namely that particular situations have a Janus-like 
quality, in the sense that they are capable not only of showing what action is 
called for but of revealing and clarifying what one’s fundamental trans-sit-
uational moral duties really are.6 This raises the possibility that a suitably 
devised thought-experiment could illuminate fundamental trans-situ-
ational moral duties, which explains in turn why moral pluralists might 
well have a moral philosophical interest in literature: literature is very often 
preoccupied with the detailed particularities of situations, indeed with what 
makes them singular, unique, and unrepeatable.
Let me elaborate on this. For the moral pluralist, moral dilemmas carry 
epistemological significance: they not only indicate that the agent in ques-
tion has moral deliberative work to do, but are held to be potentially rev-
elatory of what our fundamental and often competing moral duties really 
are. They are, in this sense, not regarded as an inconvenient symptom of 
moral cognitive frailty, but instead as an essential and substantive part of 
moral life. This provides us with the beginnings of an explanation as to why 
moral pluralists might be drawn to literature as a possible source of moral 
insight. Literary works thrive on conflict in its broadest sense, the tension 
which imbues the work with its movement and life. What better (what more 
important) conflict could there be than a moral dilemma? Moral pluralists, 
I would suggest, are liable to acquire an affinity for literature, in the hope of 
gaining insight not only into the processes of moral deliberation, but into 
what it is to be in a moral dilemma, into what moral dilemmas really are, 
and into what the underivative moral duties that are presumed to ground a 
given moral dilemma might actually be.
When I speak of the particularity of situations in a work of literature, I 
refer not only to plot but to character. As far as character is concerned, one 
may encounter not only those of the people depicted, but the uniqueness 
of an implied author who is implicitly shaping and constructing the way in 
which events and people are presented. I want to suggest that the way in 
which the reader is shown different states of mind will typically take place 
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within the context of acts of imagined empathy. One must empathize with 
the implied author in order to understand, in all of its phenomenal rich-
ness, what it is that they are trying to convey. This is of interest to moral 
pluralists because, on the Rossian view at least, many of our moral duties 
are intrinsically social, for example, the duties of fidelity and gratitude. Such 
duties derive from the complex network of social relations in which human 
moral life takes place. Moral pluralists may therefore be drawn to literature 
on the grounds that the modalities of disclosure characteristic of literary 
experience are conducive to revelations about the essentially social nature 
of many of our moral duties.
My remarks so far are preliminary and somewhat speculative. But 
they do show that moral pluralists have grounds to be attracted to the 
idea that the philosophical study of literature holds a certain promise for 
their field. If some of the hypotheses that I have just outlined should turn 
out to be true, it may be found that there exist, or merely that there could 
exist, literary works harbouring the basis for valuable new moral philo-
sophical insights, and this in itself is epistemologically rather interesting. 
Certain possibilities are surely worth exploring: that the embeddedness 
of sociality within a reader’s literary experience could be conducive to 
revelations about the nature of our social duties; that a literary work’s 
treatment of a dilemma could illuminate the phenomenology of tractive 
and gainful moral deliberation; that a fictional account of a particular 
situation in all of its uniqueness and specificity could refine our under-
standing of fundamental moral duties which have universal application.7 
Such possibilities have an immediate bearing on our understanding 
of the scope of the field of moral epistemology. They are pertinent to 
ethical issues of the highest order and could advance the field of moral 
pluralism.
testimony versus practical experience
Two separate axiological points are worth bearing in mind here, and will 
inform much of this article’s discussion. Firstly, moral values do not change 
from one situation to another, and are potentially applicable not only in all 
actual situations, but in all possible situations. Indeed, a large part of their 
moral epistemological significance lies in their constancy, for they are not 
governed by contingency or expediency, but themselves govern what is right, 
what is good, what is virtuous, and so on—in morally serious literature as 
much, I would suggest, as in real life. Secondly, values are not experienced 
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in the abstract, but precisely in our experience of the particularity of the 
world. We experience values in the first instance as value-properties of other 
entities, for example, the courage of a (particular) soldier, the beauty of a 
(particular) painting, the value of a (particular) beggar’s freedom. For these 
reasons, to the extent that literary works demonstrate a marked tendency 
to deal in the particularity of concrete events and situations, and (through 
the use of rhetoric) to implicitly evaluate objects of experience often in the 
very process of purporting merely to describe them, the domain of litera-
ture itself seems to be pointing outside of itself to an essentially nonliterary 
context for the justification of its evaluative (and hence moral) suggestions: 
the domain of practical experience. The domain of practical experience is, 
indeed, from a moral epistemological standpoint, an extremely important 
justificatory context, for ideas about value which bore initially the char-
acter of mere suggestion, or even plausible suggestion, can come to be 
internalised and embraced as one’s own through the observation of, and 
the conscious volitional intervention in, the affairs of the world around us.
An important line of response to what I have said about the justifi-
catory importance of practical experience centres on the observation that 
there are many possible experiences, for example, experiencing the trauma 
and aftermath of a terrorist attack, or losing a parent to Alzheimer’s disease, 
which may be highly relevant to moral enquiry, but for which the arrange-
ment of practical experience by the enquiring moral philosopher is not a 
feasible or desirable option. Moral philosophical enquiry with an interest 
(and, in particular, a phenomenological interest) in such scenarios will be 
obliged to pursue alternative modes of epistemological justification. Such 
modes, for example, testimony (broadly construed), imaginative introspec-
tion, and the method of reflective equilibrium (I want to argue that litera-
ture can be involved in all of these), to the extent that they are employable 
where practical experience is not, might be said in this respect to hold a 
certain epistemic advantage over practical experience.
Yet it is important that any explication of this epistemic advantage 
should not confuse the notion of justificatory availability with that of jus-
tificatory authority, and nor should it confuse partial justification with 
adequate justification. These important distinctions are illustrated in the 
following example. Suppose I am in a busy shopping street and I break my 
glasses (which have a correct prescription of, say, -5 dioptres) in an acci-
dent. Suppose further that in my bag I have an old pair of glasses made to 
an out-of-date prescription of, say, -2 dioptres. Then, provided the old pair 
helps me to see more clearly, even to some small extent, the best option 
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would seem to be to put it on. But just because wearing the old pair is the 
best available option, it does not follow that it acquires an elevated level of 
justificatory authority in relation to what I believe I am seeing, beyond what 
is merited by a -2 dioptre pair of glasses being worn by someone whose 
correct prescription is -5 dioptres. The epistemological distinctions which 
emerge from this example (between justificatory availability and justifica-
tory authority, and between partial justification and adequate justification) 
will turn out to be fundamental to my overall account of the relation between 
literature and moral knowledge. Both distinctions will be worth bearing in 
mind as we proceed through this discussion and consider different modali-
ties of moral justification from the standpoint of moral pluralism.
For reasons which rest upon the notion (which I shall shortly discuss) 
of personal credibility, an individual’s moral testimony could be regarded 
as a potential source of (at least partial) moral justification, and given our 
present concerns, this observation seems to invite us to consider whether 
there might be circumstances in which moral suggestions found in a liter-
ary work could themselves be regarded as “testimony” in some sense. One 
reason for developing a notion of a distinctively literary form of testimony 
is connected to the relation between literature and culture. Literature is an 
important repository of cultural values, and if a literary work is held to be 
of canonical status, then we expect it to illuminate, as well as resist and 
attempt to revise, the way in which the culture in which the work arose 
understood certain values. If a literary work manages on certain occasions 
to somehow reproduce cultural values, or represent aspects of the way in 
which values are wrestled with and forged within a given culture, then we 
might justifiably call this a kind of “cultural testimony.” This is relevant to 
moral reflection because it is important for moral philosophers to be aware 
of implicit cultural assumptions, blind spots, and biases which might oth-
erwise go undetected and unexamined.
We need to consider, however, whether the moral suggestions found in 
a literary work can on occasion be regarded as a form of testimony about 
moral values, as well as about cultural values. The analogy between reading 
a morally serious work of literature and receiving moral testimony from a 
real person is not entirely straightforward. One’s acceptance of the testi-
mony of a real person requires, as I said, his or her credibility as an attester 
in the relevant subject area. An attester can be held to be credible if they 
are sincere, competent (in a position to know), coherent, and have a track 
record of reliability. If I listen to a recording of Bertrand Russell and hear 
him assert, for instance, that “Love is wise, hatred foolish,” then I may well 
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be inclined to accord his statement a degree of authority greater than that 
of mere suggestion, because of what I know about the historical person 
Bertrand Russell. But this structure of testimonially grounded justification 
is not applicable to the views of an implied author, who is constituted heter-
onomously on the basis of the literary text. So there seems to be a structural 
reason for being more cautious about testimony given by an implied author, 
even if the implied author’s imaginary credentials happen to be impeccable. 
However, an implied author can certainly be coherent, and could appear 
to develop a track record of reliability in moral questions.8 So a modified 
conception of “testimony” could be applicable to an essentially intersub-
jective approach to literary experience. Imaginative empathy could be said 
to become an experience of (at least partially reliable) literary testimony 
when one feels prepared, to some degree, to trust the implied author’s value 
commitments and moral judgment on certain matters. Such tentative and 
qualified trust can only rationally arise when one realizes, on the basis of 
careful study and reflection upon a work, and preferably upon multiple 
works by the same author and ostensibly by the same implied author, that 
the implied author has a track record of suggesting evaluative and moral 
stances that have turned out, for the morally enquiring reader, to be worth 
taking seriously.
We need to observe that the tentative growth of such testimonial trust 
can be compromised if the implied author demonstrates in the course of 
a literary work tendencies toward moral inconsistency, contradiction, or 
incoherence. This remains the case even if the implied author occasionally 
displays moral brilliance, if the reader sometimes or even often finds him/
herself agreeing with the implied author’s moral judgments, or if the reader 
finds nontestimonially grounded routes to justifying those judgments with 
which s/he agrees. Conversely, if the attentive reader attains a relatively 
clear and consistent overall apperception of the implied author’s principles 
and approach to moral problems, then this could provide partial grounds, 
in conjunction with a track record of reliability, for a tentative testimonial 
trust in moral suggestions contained in the work, not least because a stable 
and reliable evaluative attitude is, by the standards of any mainstream theo-
retical school of ethical thought, an admirable and morally relevant trait in 
a moral agent. This is one modest way in which the moral epistemic status 
of a literary work (I leave aside aesthetic considerations in this article) can 
begin to be put to the test in the very context of literary experience.
However, I would still maintain that such tentative quasi-testimonial 
trust could not be regarded as justificatorily adequate on its own. Acceptance 
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of moral testimony about values not only requires that the attester be cred-
ible, but also ultimately requires that the testimony itself cohere with the 
recipient’s evolving set of personal moral values, which govern the indi-
vidual’s ability to identify what is morally salient about a given situation. I 
want to suggest that such value commitments do not, for the moral pluralist 
who does not happen to be an ethical intuitionist, flow spontaneously from 
ostensibly self-evident insights, but need instead to be arrived at through 
a complex and difficult process of reflective equilibrium. Let us look more 
closely at the ways in which literary experience can support such a method 
of reflective equilibrium.
reflective equilibrium
It is often suggested that in the method of reflective equilibrium one tries 
to work one’s way back to a personal set of moral values capable of under-
pinning and explaining disparate moral judgements, and that one has to 
work hard in order to discover the very values that one antecedently and 
unreflectively believes in.9 During this process, one rationally includes 
experiences that come from a wide variety of justificatory sources, drawing 
upon testimony, practical experience, the experience of art, and all of one’s 
memories of these.
It would suit the cause of literary moral cognitivism if we could some-
how argue that the encounter with a literary work can itself provide a set-
ting in which entire contemplative processes aimed at morally reflective 
equilibrium can take place. But precisely the inverse of this picture seems 
now to be emerging: properly wide-ranging, eclectic, and open-ended 
moral ruminations themselves provide a context in which literary expe-
rience can certainly participate in, but never responsibly dominate, moral 
reflective activities. On this view, literature can properly be regarded as a 
moral cognitive participant but not, strictly speaking, as a teacher of moral 
knowledge. A central aspect of literature’s relation to ethical thought lies in 
the idea that there is something special about literature’s capacity for moral 
suggestion. I am inclined to explicate this capacity in terms of an essen-
tially rhetorical ability to deftly deliver and implant complex evaluative 
perspectives into the reader’s experience, a seductive ability that very often 
produces its effects in a manner which is phenomenologically prior to the 
reader’s conscious grasp of how the text itself is operating. Unreasoned and 
lacking in explicit justification in their literary context as they may be, such 
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suggestions are not ultimately justificatorily insignificant in a reader’s moral 
life, provided that the reader feels (and I do mean feels) that a substantive 
or even original evaluative point has been well made, and that what is being 
suggested comes from an implied author whose implied moral judgment 
the reader has come to respect, and coheres with moral testimony that the 
reader has received from real individuals whom s/he thinks trustworthy, 
and coheres too with the reader’s own practical life experiences and with 
beliefs the reader already holds. So justified moral understanding does seem 
to be capable of developing in certain ways precisely in the accumulation of 
disparate suggestions, suggestions which themselves are not explicitly jus-
tified in their own narrow contexts, but which often seem to be capable of 
corroborating, as well as conflicting with, one another, in the ongoing and 
in principle interminable morally reflective processes of sifting, comparing, 
and revisiting one’s own life experiences, including one’s experiences of art 
and of literature.
According to the model of ethical reflection that I wish to advance, 
then, the way we feel about individual scenarios, and the judgements we are 
inclined to form when considering them in isolation, have a contributory 
role to play but do not in the first instance govern what counts as morally 
right or valuable, because they need to be weighed and balanced against a 
multiplicity of other experiences and sources of moral suggestion before 
something approaching a responsibly considered moral judgement can be 
formed. In other words, I want to suggest that the moral intuitions that 
we form noninferentially and nonreflectively about particular situations 
should carry deliberative weight but not decisive normative authority. Yet, 
as McMahan indicates, there are good reasons for enquiring whether non-
inferential and nonreflective moral intuitions should be taken into account 
at all.10 We know from the social sciences that moral intuitions can originate 
in prejudices inculcated during one’s upbringing, in religious indoctrina-
tion or in unconscious self-interest. This kind of psychological observation 
has led some philosophers, for example, Peter Singer, to argue that moral 
intuitions should be excluded from ethical deliberation. According to 
Singer, moral enquiry is primarily theoretical and is not validated through 
the consonance of its implications with our intuitions.
One way of problematizing the exclusively theoretical approach to 
moral philosophy is to consider the way counterexamples often func-
tion in the very context of moral theory. If a moral theoretical proposi-
tion P is being considered, then a counterexample will claim that there 
is a  situation S in which we would not be inclined to accept that P is the 
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case. So counterexamples cited in this way themselves appeal to our moral 
 intuitions. While counterintuitive scientific theories such as relativity the-
ory are capable of effectively combating our intuitions about what is really 
the case through their explanatory and predictive power, moral theories do 
not have a similar capacity to make us give up our moral intuitions, because 
they do not explain or predict empirical facts in this kind of way. Now it is 
certainly true that our moral intuitions about situations can be modified 
as a result of moral reflection (and very often they need to be), and that 
moral theoretical thought is an important part of such reflection. But as 
long as a moral theory produces practical conclusions that conflict with 
our intuitions, we do not feel philosophically comfortable about accepting 
the theory, even if we are unable to articulate why we feel the theory is 
mistaken. A good explanation for this, and one which is prominent in early 
twentieth-century continental philosophy, is that feelings are precisely the 
context in which value perceptions take place.11 The fact that moral intui-
tions can often be nonveridical is a reason not for discarding them from 
ethical deliberation, but for recognizing the importance of modifying them 
in the process of reflective equilibrium that I have described.
introspection
Implicit in much that I have said is that this entire reflective process is 
pervaded by acts of introspection as one attempts to reach the “equilibrium” 
of a mature set of values. Indeed, the conscious activity of introspection 
seems to offer us a potentially promising line of enquiry into the processes 
of moral justification in a literary context. Introspection is a fairly common 
component of moral justificatory and confirmatory efforts. And it now 
seems plausible to suggest that introspection on the part of the reader is 
not out of place in the context of a contemplative reading experience. For 
one thing, the empathic understanding of a foreign personality is conducive 
to comparing one’s own value commitments with those of the Other. In 
this context, the empathizer sees where value commitments are shared, and 
where one holds a value commitment which the Other has not acquired, 
or vice-versa. Similarly, it is natural during the reading process to compare 
one’s own evaluative attitudes, moral character, and approaches to moral 
problems with those of the implied author.12 Literary moral cognitivists 
ought to be encouraged by the apparent moral relevance of introspection 
to literary experience, because it opens the door to the possibility that there 
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may be occasions on which a reader could rationally decide that what a 
literary work is suggesting is in fact morally justified, without turning to 
cognitive activities extrinsic to the encounter with the literary work. To 
begin to investigate this hypothesis, I want to think about the justifica-
tory significance of introspection within moral pluralist thought, and to 
consider in tandem with this the scope for such introspective justificatory 
activities to take place during literary experience.
There are several ways in which introspection occupies a special place 
within moral enquiry over against other epistemic fields. The underlying 
reason for this can be formulated in terms of the clarification and unfolding 
of one’s own personal hierarchy of value commitments. One naturally seeks 
to acquire evidence to either corroborate or challenge suggestions of the 
form “A is of greater value than B” through an introspective attending to 
the respective depths of one’s feelings for A and for B. Some acts of valuing, 
for example, those found in the bonds between parents and their offspring, 
seem to be so profound that they do not appear to be compatible with any 
kind of ethical deliberation. For example, a mother may introspect and find 
that her love for her child is absolute and unconditional. Such values, which 
we might call absolute values, seem to be self-verifying in the context of 
introspection. Yet complex and controversial moral questions articulated 
in the form of value comparison, for example, “Is systematic state inter-
vention in the problem of vagrancy preferable to relying on spontaneous 
compassion and charity within local communities?” can rarely be resolved 
by means of a single act of introspection. In such cases, the moral philos-
opher typically proceeds by drawing on activities such as reason, debate, 
testimony, memory, practical experience, and perhaps even the experience 
of art. But during such processes, one will inevitably return again and again 
to introspective acts of value comparison. In the accumulation of such tem-
porally disparate and intermittent introspection, one hopes not to oscillate 
endlessly between contradictory commitments, but ultimately to converge 
upon a settled clarification of where one genuinely stands. Moreover, the 
realization that one’s mind is settled with respect to a particular matter is 
itself acquired in an act of introspection.
Questions of refining, unfolding, or converging upon a settled eval-
uative attitude which is congruent to one’s personality and moral tenor 
bring us now to an important reason why literary experience can provide 
an important context for moral introspection. Great artworks collectively 
provide a variety of morally complex situations, vividly portrayed, far in 
excess of the range of experiences that any given person could possibly have 
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in the course of a lifetime spent without art. In the case of literature, this 
very variety affords readers opportunities they would not otherwise have 
had to examine their own affective response to situations, to explore the 
personal value commitments that seem to motivate such responses, and to 
allow values that would not otherwise have to been felt to begin to unfold 
within their personality. It affords readers, furthermore, opportunities to 
reflect upon their own general moral evaluative attitude and to consider 
how flexible it is in assessing different situations; to reflect, also, upon how 
confidently one is able to pick out aspects of situations that seem to be 
morally salient. For any morally serious reader, such careful and attentive 
introspection can often turn out to be a less than comfortable experience. 
Indeed, part of the moral epistemological significance of literature lies in 
the way it can often disrupt our prejudices and leave us feeling uncertain on 
important moral issues.
imaginative introspection
In one sense, then, literary introspection can take place in moments of 
contemplation during the process of reading and criticism, when one 
introspects upon certain characteristics (e.g., stability, confidence, or their 
opposites) of one’s own evaluative attitude toward what one has read. 
Yet there is a different sense in which introspection, albeit in a modified 
form, can be said to take place during literary experience, and which is 
also relevant to moral justification. This relates to imagining oneself in a 
counterfactual situation depicted in the work (e.g., imagining for a time 
not being the narrator but actually meeting for oneself the beggar described 
in The Old Cumberland Beggar), and attempting to explore what one’s own 
value commitments might then be. In short, one is performing an act of 
introspection within an act of the imagination. Let us call this imaginative 
introspection.
I am making a clear distinction, then, between the conscious activities 
during literary experience of imaginative introspection and imaginative 
empathy. In Art, Emotion, and Ethics,13 Berys Gaut places great emphasis 
upon the moral confirmatory significance of imaginative involvement in 
literature, and it is clear in this context (I have in mind here in particular his 
book’s seventh chapter, entitled “The Cognitive Argument: The Epistemic 
Claim”) that sometimes he is referring to imaginative introspection, and on 
other occasions to imaginative empathy. I mentioned earlier the relevance 
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of imaginative empathy to an expanded conception of “testimony” in a lit-
erary context. For our present purposes, it is important that we now con-
sider more closely the notion of imaginative introspection. Gaut’s account 
of the epistemic significance of imaginative involvement in a literary work 
can help us to do this.14
I am in agreement with Gaut on certain general epistemological points 
that he makes that support the view that imaginative introspection can 
under certain circumstances be epistemically worthwhile and justificato-
rily contributive. Perhaps most fundamentally (and this point is relevant 
to imaginative empathy too), moral values applicable in a counterfactual 
situation should rationally be applicable in actuality, and vice-versa: moral 
values range across the set of actual and possible counterfactual situations. 
This means that value commitments that come to light during imaginative 
introspection can be regarded, if not as discoveries then at least as partially 
justified hypotheses, about one’s own present and actual value commit-
ments. In addition, the principle of the universalizability of moral judg-
ments requires that moral judgements be applicable to anybody meeting 
the criteria proper to the judgment. Since “anybody” includes the person 
making the moral judgment, imaginative introspection can be an impor-
tant tool in confirming or disproving such universalizability.
Gaut makes further valid points which are pertinent to imaginative 
introspection when he observes that some epistemic advantage is held by 
the imagination over direct experience in virtue of the facts that (1) two 
mutually exclusive future possibilities can both be imagined and com-
pared, but not both directly experienced, and (2) that some experiences 
are so unlikely or undesirable that one is rationally obliged to resort to the 
imagination in order to find out more about how one would respond to 
them.15 I do not disagree with these last two claims in themselves (in fact, I 
think they are important observations) but I am concerned that the man-
ner in which Gaut deploys them seems designed to make them serve as 
a consolation for his reluctant admission that the imagination has “lesser 
epistemic authority”16 than practical experience. Granted, Gaut is careful 
never to explicitly claim that justificatory availability can compensate for 
a shortfall in justificatory authority. But he also manages to avoid drawing 
much attention to the important conceptual distinction between justifica-
tory availability and justificatory authority, and this omission risks making 
his position appear more convincing than it really is. I will also want to 
suggest in due course that there are good reasons for thinking that Gaut 
needs to pay more attention to the distinction between partial justification 
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and adequate justification.17 To begin to see why this might be the case, we 
need to look more closely at his account of the potential role for literature 
in imaginative introspection.
During practical moral deliberation, one is often concerned not simply 
with the set of all possible situations, but with situations which correspond 
either to the way the world is now, or to the way the world will be in the 
future: one is concerned, in short, not only with the possible, but with real-
ity, and with the way reality is likely to be. One context in which realism 
becomes important is when we seek to seriously investigate kinds of possi-
bilities that seem to be intricately bound up with what it is to be human. One 
need only turn to Shakespeare to find examples of the kind of possibilities 
that I have in mind here. Somebody who is both insecure and jealous may 
be inclined toward murder. The Machiavellian machinations of somebody 
gripped by political ambition may end in personal disaster.18 These are not 
laws of human behavior, but there is truth to them to the extent that they 
delineate patterns that have recurred throughout human history, and to the 
extent that they can indicate on certain occasions what is likely to be the 
case, or how matters are likely to end. If, as part of a serious moral enquiry, 
one is to try to imagine such a situation, or even to imagine being caught up 
in one, then one’s imaginings would need to be informed and constrained 
by justified psychological beliefs concerning the way the people involved 
would be likely to behave, and what their motivations would be likely to be. 
Psychological realism is therefore particularly important to the exercise of 
the imagination in the context of moral enquiry.
But there can also be occasions on which one’s understanding of what 
is likely will also need to be informed by what is known scientifically or 
statistically. Consider the following example. Suppose someone (let us call 
him William) is inclined toward believing that there should be no system-
atic state intervention in the problem of vagrancy and that homeless people 
should have to rely upon spontaneous charity from the local community. 
As part of his moral deliberation, William decides to investigate the univer-
salizability of this judgment by imagining himself being a homeless person 
living rough in the countryside of, say, northern England. His intention 
is to see if, in the imaginary situation, he still believes there should be no 
state intervention. However, before William even begins his imaginative 
introspection, he realizes that he is going to have to do some research into 
overnight temperature ranges for this part of England, and some statistical 
research into the probability of a homeless person in this part of the country 
receiving charitable assistance. Imaginative introspection, then, in a moral 
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context, often requires background psychological knowledge and under-
standing of human motivations, but can also require many other kinds of 
knowledge, such as scientific or statistical. It is important for our present 
purposes to note that the acquisition of such background knowledge is not 
part of the imaginational activity itself, but a prerequisite for it.
Gaut makes some helpful points regarding how literary works and their 
careful readers can contribute to the project of attempting to imagine in a 
realistic manner. For one thing, many literary works are not aimed at fan-
tasy but at realism, and such works can guide the reader into realistic imag-
inings. The putative realism of a work needs to be independently verified, 
and this is addressed by one aspect of Gaut’s account of using the imag-
ination in a disciplined way: one’s imaginings must fit with the available 
independent evidence and cohere with things that one already knows. This 
is surely right, but I believe two further points of qualification, to which 
Gaut pays insufficient attention, need to be added. First, the source of ver-
ification involved here is not the literary work, but background knowledge 
(for example, psychological, scientific, statistical) which is extrinsic to the 
literary work. Second, it seems strange to try to wrap all of the verifica-
tory effort into imaginational activity, since an important part of such effort 
(that is, gathering background knowledge) is a prerequisite for the imagi-
national activity. Granted, the literary work is contributing to imaginative 
introspection by guiding the reader into realistic imaginings, and imagina-
tive introspection can contribute to moral justification. So at this stage we 
need to limit our acceptance of Gaut’s position to the view that literature 
can contribute partially to the processes of moral justification by means of 
imaginative introspection.
Fidelity to reality, and more specifically to the psychological and soci-
ological facts about human life, and to scientific facts about the empiri-
cal world, then, is a characteristic of imaginative content that can support 
moral enquiry. But there are at least two other characteristics worth consid-
ering: vividness and completeness of scope. Vividness in this context really 
refers to richness of detail, and is therefore not equivalent to fidelity: an act 
of the imagination may be faithful to reality but have a disappointing level 
of vividness, and vice-versa.
Vividness is important to imaginative introspection because the more 
vivid one’s imaginings are, the more likely one is to become emotionally 
involved, and to form clear evaluations with respect to the people and sit-
uations that are being imagined. If one imagines a situation vividly, then 
it is as if (but only as if) one is perceiving the situation for oneself. Great 
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literary works typically display an assured yet unostentatious ability on the 
part of the implied author to depict scenes vividly, and thereby to facilitate 
an absorbed imaginative involvement on the part of the reader, in which 
the reader’s deepest moral commitments may come to light, perhaps even 
for the first time.19 Part of the burden also falls upon the committed reader, 
who with sufficient practice can develop an imaginative faculty capable of 
great vividness, sometimes even on the basis of relatively meagre levels of 
rich detail provided within the literary text.
There is, nonetheless, a tension here that we need to be wary of. Vivid 
imaginings, for all their importance within the processes of rational moral 
enquiry, may not be as straightforwardly conducive to moral clarity as one 
might initially think. Vivid imaginings are essentially perspectival: it is as 
if one were really there, perceiving events not only from a certain spatial 
viewpoint, but from a certain personal viewpoint. One finds that, purely 
due to the way a literary work has been written, certain aspects of vividly 
imagined situations are more salient than others. Vivid imaginings, then, 
do not constitute a pristine and neutral horizon for moral contemplation, 
but are instead already invested with and pervaded by myriad implicit value 
commitments which work to condition any subsequent moral deliberation. 
Part of the difficulty here is connected with the fact that literary works often 
produce their complex evaluative effects prior to the reader’s grasp of how 
the text’s rhetoric is operating. Even the most ostensibly dry and clinically 
detached police procedural novel can deeply implant within the unsuspect-
ing reader, through subtle and understated turns of rhetoric, through the 
inclusion of certain ostensibly minor details and the exclusion of certain 
others, value perceptions that can skew the way situations are understood, 
that influence which characters one feels sympathy for, that can determine 
to some extent whether the reader feels suspicious, uneasy, trusting, and so 
on. The capacity of a literary work to seduce the reader into feeling a certain 
way is partly what distinguishes literature from scientific texts, for example, 
or from an impartial police witness statement suitable to be considered in 
a court of law. Paradoxically, then, while the very vividness of the imagin-
ings that can take place during literary experience can support imaginative 
introspection, the perspectival character of such vivid imaginings suggests 
that further justificatory work will still be required. If moral justificatory 
progress is being made here, its justificatory character is contributive, not 
decisive.
The double bind that seems now to be emerging might be restated as 
follows. Allowing literature qua literature to contribute where it can to moral 
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justificatory efforts (in particular those in which imaginational  activity is 
pivotal) requires concessions on the part of the moral enquirer to literature’s 
perspectivism, and to that extent a displacement in these phases of moral 
activity of the pretensions to discursive objectivity that are sometimes held 
to be of a piece with rational moral enquiry. For those of us even remotely 
inclined to explore the extent of the potential cognitive significance of the 
imagination, the answer surely cannot be that we aim for a wholesale repres-
sion of vivid imaginings from moral philosophical activity.
A better alternative might be to indulge at certain moments the biases 
and tendentiousness that vivid imaginings (especially those deriving in 
some way from literary experience) to a greater or lesser extent usually 
bring, and then seek in due course to draw them back into broader over-
arching processes of rational moral deliberation. The paradox is that while 
realistic vivid imaginings can support moral justification in the ways that 
I have discussed, their doing so involves adopting and emphasizing cer-
tain perspectives, and closing off others which could still be pertinent to the 
moral issue in question.
The problem we still face, in other words, could be described as one 
of completeness of scope, if completeness of scope in imagining a morally 
demanding situation requires the ability to see the situation from all mor-
ally relevant angles. This corresponds to the third characteristic of imagi-
native content that I mentioned earlier. It is not unheard of for a literary 
work to repeatedly return to the same scene, describing it each time from a 
different perspective, and perhaps even from the points of view of different 
characters.20 This is one way in which a literary work can begin to mitigate 
the problem of completeness of scope.
I want to suggest, however, a more general way of broadening one’s 
perspectival scope on moral problems which can still involve imaginative 
introspection in the context of literary experience, and which does not rely 
upon a given literary work treating the same situation from multiple per-
spectives. This more general solution is for the reader to seek out multiple 
works which all engage with the same, or very similar, moral issues, and to 
undertake activities of imaginative introspection during the encounter with 
each work. This approach takes advantage of the facts not only that one’s 
value commitments tend to come to light most saliently during the actual 
experience, or vividly imagined experience, of particular situations, but also 
that precisely these value commitments, if truly one’s own, in principle span 
all possible situations, and are therefore certainly applicable across multiple 
literary works which aspire, minimally, to portraying possible situations. 
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For example, having studied Wordsworth’s The Old Cumberland Beggar, 
one might then seek out other works by Wordsworth, and then works by 
other authors, which undertake morally serious thematic enquiry into the 
nature of encounters with homeless people, or more generally, with individ-
uals living, in some sense, on the margins of society. The exploration of a 
complex moral issue of this kind, I want to suggest, can always benefit from 
being investigated in different ways, and in particular by exploiting the 
moral epistemic advantages that can flow from imaginative involvement in 
the perspectives belonging to different personalities.
conclusion
My underlying point, which is supported by the different lines of inves-
tigation pursued in this paper, is that moral philosophical enquiry, in an 
approach to ethics compatible with both literary moral cognitivism and 
moral pluralism, is best conceived in gradualist terms, and that important 
moral issues with which literary works very often substantively engage are 
rarely if ever capable of being exhaustively or even adequately “decided” on 
the basis of the putative insights contained within a single literary work, no 
matter how seemingly thorough and convincing that work’s thematic elab-
orations might be. We have certainly found that literature can contribute 
substantively to the processes of moral justification, and that this contri-
bution can gain greater justificatory authority if multiple relevant literary 
works are taken into account. Even so, we must accept that the nature of 
literature’s role in moral justification ultimately remains contributive rather 
than decisive. Indeed, at every turn in this paper, we have found grounds 
for epistemological caution in relation to the question of literary moral 
cognitivism from a moral pluralist point of view: caution, because liter-
ary experience itself points beyond literature to practical experience as a 
proper domain for moral justification; caution, because literature’s status 
as a potential source of moral testimony is partially compromised by the 
fact that the implied author is not ontically transcendent to the work, but 
instead is constituted heteronomously on the basis of what is given in 
the text; caution, because the complex processes of reflective equilibrium 
necessarily take in a variety of sources of experience and justification, of 
which literature is but one; caution, because part of the verificatory effort 
involved in ensuring imaginative realism is extrinsic to literary experience; 
and caution, because the perspectival character of realistic vivid imaginings 
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evoked by any given literary work structurally entails a risk of excluding 
morally pertinent ways of viewing a depicted situation, and is liable, in 
virtue of the very deployment of rhetoric that renders literature precious 
to us, to be pervaded by implicit and even subtly tendentious evaluative 
suggestions.
The thesis of this article is therefore that there are important affinities 
between literary moral cognitivism and moral pluralism, at the levels of 
both moral suggestion and moral justification, but that the affinities are not 
sufficiently tight to support the strong version of literary moral cognitivism 
which I mentioned in my introduction. For the reasons identified in the 
course of this discussion, I recognize that literature qua literature does have 
an epistemologically significant capacity for moral suggestion, but that it is 
ultimately misleading to claim that literature teaches us about morality, or 
that literature can strictly speaking be regarded as a source of moral knowl-
edge, owing to the conspicuous frangibility of literature’s various contribu-
tions to the processes of moral justification. Cognitivist protestations which 
involve resorting to the mantra that putative knowledge need not be inde-
feasible begin to have the look of straw clutching when, as I have argued, it 
becomes in the end rather difficult to accept in good epistemic conscience 
that literature fully satisfies the justification condition from a moral plural-
ist perspective.
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notes
1. This paper adopts the terminology of “moral cognitivism” developed in Gaut 
(2007), e.g., 136.
2. For an example of this kind of challenge, see Lamarque & Olsen (1994), 368.
3. Let me provide some further clarification of what I mean, as far as this arti-
cle is concerned, by “Gettier-style counterexamples.” Sometimes a rational 
person may arrive, for justifiable reasons, at a belief which, though true, is 
in some sense fortuitously so. Consider the following example. Suppose my 
watch stopped yesterday at 3 p.m. without my knowledge. Today I may look 
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at my watch and, seeing that it says 3 p.m., conclude that it is 3 p.m., when 
the time of day is indeed 3 p.m. I may have very good reasons for trusting my 
watch. For example, it may be a highly respected make of watch; or it may be 
a watch that was recommended to me by a friend who is a recognized watch 
expert. The point is that although I have arrived at a justified true belief, that 
the time is 3 p.m., outside observers of the situation may be inclined to have 
reservations about the claim that I have acquired knowledge that it is 3 p.m. This 
would  suggest, in turn, that there is something inadequate about the claim that 
 knowledge is justified true belief. For further detail on Gettier’s position, see 
Gettier (1963).
4. It might be asked if I have any particular scholars in mind when I raise the 
problem of nebulousness. My response is as follows. I don’t think it would be 
fair or conducive to constructive scholarly debate to track down and cite any 
particular examples of nebulousness. Even if I do have one or two scholars in 
mind, I don’t doubt that their contributions to this field far outweigh any weak-
nesses in their positions. My intention in highlighting the question of nebu-
lousness at this early stage is really to register at a meta-argumentative level a 
theoretical risk for the debate. It is a risk which may materialize in at least two 
different ways. One way is for a scholar’s line of thought to terminate in the 
bathos of ascribing to some well-known literary work the intimation of a moral 
platitude with which no commentators would be inclined to disagree. Another 
way is to be found in an unnecessary retreat into a reader-response theory of 
literary studies, according to which any insights to be gleaned from the work 
will be reader relative. I do concede that the temptation to gloss over the cen-
tral philosophical debate concerning what morality consists in can be strong, 
as if one were somehow clearing the decks for the main task in hand, namely 
the question of literary moral cognitivism as such. The drawback is that the 
moment one abstracts too far away from what morality consists in, one begins 
to lose purchase on what literature can contribute to moral reflection; on the 
nature of the insights that literature might be able to suggest; on the modes of 
moral justification that literature would need to be able to support. In short, my 
point here is that if the moral theoretical stratum of the problem is neglected, 
our debate will have to rely too heavily on intuitions when assessing the validity 
of putative examples of moral elucidation in literature.
5. For an influential exposition of a strong version of the moral particularist 
position, see Dancy (1983), which begins as follows: “This paper is about the 
non-existence of moral principles. Its conclusion is a thorough particularism, 
according to which our ethical decisions are made case by case, without the 
comforting support or awkward demands of moral principles.”
6. As Berys Gaut points out, the moral theory developed by W. D. Ross has both 
pluralist and intuitionist aspects, and these aspects are separable. The pluralist 
aspect holds that there is an irreducible plurality of foundational moral princi-
ples. The intuitionist aspect holds that if a moral philosopher reflects carefully 
enough, then each of the foundational moral principles turns out to be self-ev-
ident. See Gaut (2002), 137.
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7. An example of the kind of work that I have in mind here is Graham Greene’s 
The Power and the Glory. In this novel, a persecuted priest finds that, by pursu-
ing his vocation, he may endanger both himself and the Mexican peasants that 
he wishes to serve.
8. It might be asked what would constitute a good track record of reliability 
with respect to moral judgments. Let me break this down into two questions. 
Firstly, could there even be such a thing as a track record of reliability in a 
literary context, when the implied author is often entirely a product of some-
one’s imagination and does not correspond to a real person who is distinct 
from the literary work? Secondly, even if an implied author appears to have 
some kind of track record, what kind of criteria would it be possible to apply 
when deciding if the track record is a good one? (1) The first question is tied 
into theoretical debates concerning what it is, fundamentally, to encounter 
and study a literary text. It is not my intention to try to legislate for how 
scholars ought to go about reading literature, but it is certainly central to 
many approaches, including those, for instance, found in the Geneva School, 
to construe the encounter with a literary work in intersubjective terms—in 
terms, that is, of encountering another person replete with their own mind, 
personality, and conscious interiority. One apperceives through a careful 
studying of the text the implied author’s feelings and motivations, and the 
moral stances, attitudes, and dispositions that such feelings and motiva-
tions seem to be suggesting. In this case I would argue that it is intelligible 
to speak of an implied author’s track record of reliability, on the grounds 
that the encounter with the implied author is conceived as being sufficiently 
similar, in substantive respects, to an encounter with another person. (2) On 
the second question (concerning criteria), assuming that one has adopted an 
approach which does construe the encounter with a literary work in the kind 
of intersubjective terms that I have described above, it would be appropriate 
to adopt criteria which take into account both the quantity and the quality of 
the moral suggestions that the reader has detected. Granted, readers may not 
always calibrate the criteria that they apply entirely prudently; but this is no 
different from the criteria that we might be inclined to apply when meeting 
real people in everyday life.
9. McMahan (2001), 105–6.
10. McMahan (2001), 94–95.
11. The thinker that I primarily have in mind here is Max Scheler. The work in 
which his theory of values is developed in the greatest detail is Scheler (1973). In 
addition, I also have in mind Edith Stein, whose work on empathy Stein (1989) 
is influenced by Scheler’s position.
12. An example of the kind of work that I have in mind here is Women in Love by 
D. H. Lawrence. In this novel, Lawrence employs dialogical exchanges between 
various characters to explore differing views about marriage, relationships, and 
sexuality. For instance, as the novel draws to a close, Rupert and Ursula have 
a conversation in which they disagree about the similarities and differences 
between heterosexual and homosexual love (481). This kind of articulation by 
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Lawrence of conflicting views is conducive to the reader introspectively com-
paring what is said with his or her own attitudes.
13. Gaut (2007).
14. The transition which now takes place toward a discussion of the role of imag-
inative introspection marks an intensification of this paper’s scrutiny of what 
I take to be Berys Gaut’s version of literary moral cognitivism. This should 
not be interpreted as a discontinuity in the nature of the discussion which is 
unfolding. On the contrary, the underlying agenda remains the same: to inves-
tigate the contributions that literature can make to those modes of justification 
which are particularly germane to moral reflection. It is an enquiry similar in 
approach and purpose to that which Gaut himself undertakes in Chapter 7 of 
Art, Emotion and Ethics (2007). Any critique of Gaut formulated in the remain-
der of this paper is developed not for its own sake, but purely in support of the 
overall purposes of this paper.
15. Gaut (2007), 156.
16. Gaut (2007), 156.
17. In many other important respects, of course, my debt to Gaut (2007) is 
significant.
18. The Shakespearean examples that I have in mind here are, in the case of jeal-
ousy, Othello, and, in the case of political ambition, Richard III.
19. In my opinion, John Updike is a master at vividly describing quotidian details 
in a memorable and arresting way. Here is an example from Rabbit Is Rich, 421: 
“the pink patches in his face glowed red and his lips tightened back from his 
teeth so you thought all the more of his skull. Dirty yellow teeth loaded with 
gum-line fillings, and his mustache never looked quite even, or quite clean.”
20. For example, in the Julian Barnes novel Talking It Over, the three main charac-
ters, Stuart, Gillian, and Oliver, provide different accounts of the same events. 
The effect is a heightened sense of the subjectivity of memory.
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